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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STfATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

t

Plaintiff-Respondent. :

Case No. 870470

•

vs.

:

LONNIE L. MOORE,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Priority 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT^
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of Distribution of a
Controlled Substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1987) after a trial in the Seventh District
Court.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah

Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(h) (1987).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTEp ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to submit

to the jury, in addition to the given lesser included offense
instruction, additional lesser included offense instructions
offered by defendant.
2.

Whether the court should havfe found, as a matter of

law, that defendant was entrapped.
3.

Whether Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) violates the

due process clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions

-1

by imposing an enhanced penalty for violations taking place
within 1/000 feet of a school.
4.

Whether the application of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-

8(5) to defendant, a small town drug dealer, violates the equal
protection clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions.
5.

Whether Utah Code. Ann. S 58-37-8(5)(d) violates

the due process clause of the United States and Utah
Constitutions by precluding as a defense lack of knowledge about
the proximity of a school.
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules
Constitution of the United States, Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against
himself/ nor be deprived of life, liberty/ or
property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV*
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
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Constitution of Utah, Art. I S It
No person shall be deprived df life,
liberty or property, without due process of
law.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8.
(1)

Prohibited acts A —Penalties!

(a) Except as authorized by this
chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:

(ii) distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance, or to agjqee, consent,
offer, or arrange to distribute la controlled
or counterfeit substance:

(b) Any person who violates Subsection (1)
(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified i^i Schedule I
or II is, upon conviction, guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent
conviction of Subsection (l)(a) lis guilty of
a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classifed [feic] in
Schedule III or IV, or marihuana is, upon
conviction, guilty of a third degree felony,
and upon a second or subsequent conviction
punishable under this subsectionl is guilty of
a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule
V is, upon conviction, guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection
is guilty of a third degree felony.

(5)

Prohibited act E —Penaltiesi

(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of
this section, a person not authorized under
this chapter who commits any actI declared to
be unlawful under this section, chapter 3a,
Title 58, the Drug Paraphernalia|Act, or
under Chapter 37b, Title 58, thelImitation
Controlled Substances Act, shallL upon
conviction, be subjected to the penalties and
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classifications under Subsection (5) (b) if
the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary
or secondary school or on the grounds of any
of those schools;
(ii) in those portions of any
building, park, stadium, or other structure
or grounds which are, at the time of the act,
being used for an activity sponsored by or
through a school under Subsection (5)(a)(1);
(iii) within 1,000 feet of any
structure, facility, or grounds included in
Subsection (5)(a)(i) or (ii); or
(iv) with a person younger than 18
years of age, regardless of where the act
occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this
subsection is guilty of a first degree felony
and shall be imprisoned for a term of not
less than five years if the penalty that
would otherwise have been established but for
this subsection would have been a first
degree felony. Imposition or execution of
the sentence may not be suspended, nor may
the person be eligible for parole until the
minimum term of imprisonment under this
subsection has been served.
(c) If the classification that would
otherwise have been established would have
been less than a first degree felony but for
this subsection, a person convicted under
this subsection is guilty of one degree more
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that
offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution
under this subsection that the actor
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18
years of age or older at the time of the
offense, or was unaware of the individual's
true age; nor that the actor mistakenly
believed that the location where the act
occurred was not as described in Subsection
(5)(a) or was unaware that the location where
the act occurred was as described in
Subsection (5)(a).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101.
No person is guilty of an offense unless his
conduct is prohibited by law and:
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or with
a mental state otherwise specified in the
-4-

statute defining the offense, as the
definition of the offense requires; or
(2) His acts constitute an
offense
involving strict liability.
These standards of criminal responsibility
shall not apply to the violations set forth
in Title 41, Chapter 6, unless specifically
provided by law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of distributing a
controlled substance for value, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1) (a\) (ii) (Supp. 1987).
Defendant was found guilty on November 13,| 1987, after a jury
trial in the Seventh Judicial District Co^rt, in and for Grand
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Judge,
presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 16, 1986, Detectivel Kelly met with police
informer Daniel Ward in connection with th^ latter's aid in the
location and arrest of drug offenders (T. 47-48).

At

approximately 6:00 p.m. on that same day, Kr. Ward introduced
Detective Kelly, to "Blue," a man who was later identified as
defendant (T. 48A, 52). Mr. Ward's decisipn to name defendant
was motivated by the fact that defendant h£d offered to obtain a
"quantity" of drugs for him earlier that d^y (T. 130).
Defendant invited Detective Kelly and Mr. Ward into
defendant's residence where, after some small talk, Mr. Ward told
defendant that they wanted to obtain "an eighth of a crystal" of
-crack" (methamphetamine) (T. 48A, 53). F^r that purpose, Ward
and Kelly gave defendant $275, the amount hecessary to obtain the
drug (T. 53). After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain the
-5-

methamphetamine, defendant offered to try to obtain cocaine (T.
54, 67). Unable to obtain cocaine at that time, defendant then
offered to keep the money and try again the next day to obtain
the methamphetamine (T. 55, 68).
On the following day, defendant obtained and delivered
a bindle of methamphetamine to Mr. Ward, in the presence of Det.
Kelly (T. 57, 60, 107). At that time, defendant asked Mr. Ward
to Mcut him a line" from the bindle as the prearranged payment
for obtaining the drugs (T. 57-58, 70). Defendant told Ward and
Kelly they could come back again for more drugs (T. 59).
Defendant's residence is near the Grand County Middle
School (T. 82-87).

On one approach it is 482'7M from the school

yard (T. 82) and on another it is 568'7M (T. 83).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court properly instructed the jury on the

lesser included offense:
without value.

distribution of a controlled substance

Defendant is not entitled to repetitive

instructions and therefore, the court correctly refused to
include defendant's other requested instructions.
Moreover, defendant's additional instructions would not
have altered the outcome of the trial.

The evidence shows that

defendant received value for his services.

Therefore, the court

did not commit reversible error.
2.

There was sufficient evidence at trial to find

beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not entrapped.
Defendant was not pressured into obtaining the drugs, but his
acts were spontaneous and voluntary.
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In addition, the informant's relationship with
defendant was purely a "business" one and not the type of
relationship which suggests improper inducement or extreme pleas
based upon an intimate friendship•

Therefore, defendant was not

entitled to a finding of entrapment as a matter of law.
3.

Defendant was not denied due| process or equal

protection by the statutory enhancement ofl his crime for sale of
drugs within 1000 feet of school property Without regard to
defendant's knowledge that he was located hear the school.

The

statute does not create an irrebuttable presumption of such
knowledge, rather it holds defendant strictly liable for his acts
committed near a school.
Nor does the statute unconstitutionally treat defendant
differently than large town drug dealers merely because it is
possible that a greater number of drug sal^s in small towns might
occur within the 1000 foot radius than in JLarge towns.

Even if

the statute does affect a proportionately larger percentage of
small town dealers more harshly, such a re$ult is not
constitutionally prohibited since small to\|m drug dealers enjoy
no special protection for their status as ^uch.
4.

The strict liability sentence enhancement provision

for sale of drugs near a school does not violate due process by
eliminating the mens rea for the criminal act of selling drugs or
eliminating the State's burden of proof,

the drug sale must

still be intentional or knowing and the State must prove that the
sale occurred within 1000 feet of school property beyond a
reasonable doubt.

That the State is not statutorily required to
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establish defendant's knowledge of his location is not a
constitutional violation.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AND ADEQUATELY
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE WITHOUT VALUE.
Pursuant to defendant's requested instruction No. 3,
the trial court instructed the jury on distribution of a
controlled substance without value as a lesser included offense
of the crime charged (See Jury Instruction No. 6) (R. 63). In
fact# the court's jury instruction was defendant's requested
instruction, verbatim (R. 55, 63). In addition, the trial court
instructed the jury that
In construing and interpreting these
instructions, the following definitions shall
apply ... The meaning of the term
"distribute for value" means to deliver a
controlled substance in exchange for
compensation, consideration, or item of
value, or a promise therefore [sic].
Jury Instruction No. 5 (R. 62).
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred
in denying two of his requested instructions, apparently ignoring
the fact that the court did give the aforementioned lesser
included offense instruction.

While a defendant is entitled to

an instruction on his or her theory of the case, State v.
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980), the defendant is not
entitled to multiple instructions setting forth the same theory
of the case.

State v. Miller, 727 P.2d 203 (Utah 1986).

Defendant requested that the court, in addition to
defining what distribution for value dj>, define what it is not.

-8-

Such an instruction was unnecessary where the given instructions
adequately defined the offense.

The court should not be required

to instruct the jury on every fact scenario that could be
eliminated from the charged offense along with those that
constitute the offense.
Nor is there prejudicial error i£ the giving of a
party's requested instructions would not hkve affected the
outcome of the trial.
1980).

State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah

In the instant case, the trial couirt properly gave

defendant's instructions on the lesser-included offense along
with a clarifying additional instruction.

Defendant's additional

requested instruction, at most, attempted Similar clarification
by exclusion rather inclusion.

Since the trial court provided

adequate instructions defining the offense^ defendant was not
entitled to his requested instructions No. 1 and No. 2.
In addition, the outcome of the trial would not have
been affected by defendant's requested instructions because the
evidence clearly shows that defendant distributed the controlled
substance in exchange for a "line." At tr^al one of the
undercover detectives testified as follows4
Q.

Why did he cut a line?

A. It had been pre-arranged by the defendant
that he wanted a line for obtaining the
controlled substance for us; and as he
delivered it, he indicated he warited a line
for getting the controlled substance for us.
(T. 58) (see also T. 136, 141).
It is irrelevant that, as defendant argues, defendant "cut a
line" only after he delivered the substance.

The facts in this

case do not support defendant's contention that all the officer
-9-

did was "6hare" the drugs with a friend rather than pay defendant
with the "line."
Defendant's reliance on State v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d
103 (1983) is misplaced.

In that case, not only was there no

pre-arranged "payment" to the defendant for obtaining the drugs,
but the defendant's agency was clearly established by the fact
that he attempted to buy part of the drugs from the undercover
officer.

Defendant also fails to distinguish State v. Udell, 728

P. 2d 188 (1986) from the instant case.

Like in that case,

defendant in the instant case took the money and left in search
of the drugs (T. 53, 67-68).

It makes no difference whether the

defendant profited from the transaction or not.

Ici. at 134.

In

fact, the instant case suggests more strongly than Udell that
defendant received value for the substance given the existence of
the pre-arrangement in the instant case, which was missing in
Udell.

Given the overwhelming evidence showing that defendant

received value for delivery of the controlled substance, it is
unlikely that the jury would have convicted defendant of the
lesser included offense even if defendant's other two
instructions had been given.

Further, because the court's

instructions properly and adequately informed the jury of the
lesser included offense and defined the acts necessary to
establish the "for value" prong of the offense, the court's
denial of defendant's requested instructions was not error.
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POINT II
THE JURY'S FINDING BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTRAPPEI} IS AMPLY
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
At trial, defendant raised the JJssue of entrapment
based on two different grounds.

First, defendant moved to

dismiss the case alleging that the police agents had no knowledge
of defendant's drug-related activities prior to the investigation
(R. 5-10).

The court denied this motion (^. 10). Subsequently,

defendant testified in support of his entrapment defense that Dan
Ward was his close friend (T. 122). Defense counsel emphasized
this point in closing argument (T. 168). Oh appeal, defendant
pursues only the latter theory of his entrapment defense; that
the evidence establishes the entrapment defense as a matter of
law, based on his alleged friendship with the police informant.
In State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), this
Court set forth the standard to establish the entrapment defense
as follows:
[T]he test to determine an unlawful
entrapment is whether a law enforcement
official or an agent, in order to obtain
evidence of the commission of an offense,
induced the defendant to commit such an
offense by persuasion or inducement which
would be effective to persuade an average
person, other than one who was merely given
the opportunity to commit the offense.
Id. at 503 (emphasis added).
In State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366^ 369 (Utah 1980), this
Court established the standard of review of jury decisions on the
entrapment defense:

-11-

Where there is a reasonable basis in the
evidence upon which jurors could believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was
a result of a defendant's own voluntary
desire and intent to commit the crime, the
fact that a police officer merely afforded
him the opportunity to commit it, does not
amount to entrapment, (Citation omitted.)
The trial court instructed the jury on the entrapment
defense, consistent with Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-303 (1978) and
this Court's decisions based on that statute, as set forth above
(T. 154-5).

Nevertheless, the jury found defendant guilty as

charged (T. 173-4).
The evidence introduced at trial provided a reasonable
basis upon which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant was merely given an opportunity to voluntarily
commit the crime.

The State introduced evidence that defendant's

participation was not the product of persuasion or inducement on
the part of either the undercover agent or the informant, but a
purely voluntary act.

There was evidence presented at trial that

defendant was a regular supplier of drugs for the informant (T.
130-131, 139-140).
Further, defendant actively participated in the
initiative to obtain drugs for the undercover agent and the
informant.

Before the informant met with the undercover agents,

defendant offered him drugs "in quantity" (T. 130). In
defendant's house, neither the agent nor the informant insisted
upon getting the drugs, but defendant took the initiative to get
them right away (T. 53). Once the initial attempt to obtain
methamphetamine failed, defendant voluntarily offered to obtain
cocaine (T. 54). Finally, failing to obtain the substance for
-12-

the second time, defendant spontaneously requested to keep the
money overnight to make a further attempt during the next day (T.
55).

This evidence supports the jury's finding that defendant's

actions were voluntary and not the product of improper persuasion
or inducement.
Defendant mistakenly relies on ^tate v. Taylor, 599
P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), claiming that, as ih that case, defendant's
relationship with the informant was such that the entrapment
defense was established as a matter of la\^. In that case, this
Court stated:
Extreme pleas of desperate illnelss or appeals
based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close
friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of
money, are examples, depending on an
evaluation of the circumstances in each case,
of what might constitute prohibited police
conduct.
Id. at 599 P.2d 496, 503 (Utah 1979).

Accordingly, the Court

found that Taylor was entrapped, partly ba^ed on his close,
intimate relationship with the police informant.
The instant case is distinguishable from Taylor.

Not

only did the informant and defendant lack j:he sort of close
friendship established in Taylor, there is evidence tending to
show that their relationship was strictly ihat between a drug
supplier and a drug buyer (T. 139-140).

The jury was not

required to believe defendant's self-serving contradictory
testimony that he was just doing a favor f6r a very close friend.
State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 781-82 (Utah 1986) Even so,
defendant's description of the relationship did not create the
type of compelling circumstance that existed in Taylor and the
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jury could believe the two were friends without also finding that
defendant was entrapped.

Taylor does not hold that merely

establishing that the accused was friendly with the informer or
agent amounts to entrapment as a matter of law.

Taylor

contemplates the existence of much more compelling circumstances
that would persuade someone to commit the crime who was not
already willing, given the opportunity.

For these reasons

defendant was not entrapped as a matter of law.
POINT III
THE INCREASED PENALTY IMPOSED BY UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-37-8(5) IS CONSISTENT WITH THE DUE
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE
UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS.
Defendant claims that Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(5)
(Supp. 1987), which increases the penalty for certain drug
transactions that occur on, or within 1,000 feet of, a school
ground, is unconstitutional.

Defendant first contends that the

statute violates the due process clause by creating an
irrebuttable presumption that children are either

witnesses to

or "victims" of the drug transaction.
The subject statute does not create an irrebuttable
presumption that children are present during the criminal
conduct.

It neither presumes nor requires the actual presence of

a child during the drug transaction.

Instead, the statute

protects against the extreme potential for damage created by the
criminal conduct when performed on or near school grounds.
Dealing drugs on or near a school ground greatly increases the
risk that children will be targeted as customers, thus,
increasing drug use and dependency among children.
-14-

Unquestionably, the State has a compelling interest "in
safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a
minor.-

New York v. Ferber# 458 U.S. 755, 756-7 (1982) (quoting

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
This compelling interest sustains legislation aimed at protecting
the physical and emotional well-being of children "even when the
laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally
protected rights."

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757.

In the instant

case, the Legislature took measures to protect the children of
Utah from the extreme potential danger created where drug
transactions occur on or near a school ground.

This Court should

not intervene to defeat the statute's legitimate goal.
Moreover, defendant fails to shoy how this element of
the crime violates his due process rights.

Defendant cites

Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1987) for phe proposition that
the Supreme Court disfavors irrebuttable presumptions.

However,

defendant fails to explain why the alleged presumptions should be
disfavored in this case.

Nevertheless, subsequent decisions of

the Supreme Court have severely limited Vlftndis.

See Gorrie v.

Bowen, 809 F.2d 508, 524 n. 25 (9th Cir. 1$87) ("'legitimate
doubt' whether anything remains of Vlandis]').
In addition, this case is distinguishable from Vlandis.
In that case as well as in the cases cited therein, the
complaining party argued that the statute in question deprived
him or her of a fundamental right without due process of law.

A

group of university students challenged th0 constitutionality of
a statute in Vlandis which defined residency for purposes of
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tuition in a way that denied them the opportunity to show their
qualification as residents.

The Court held that the statute

deprived the student of property without due process.
Defendant does not argue, nor is there a basis to
assert, that a similar violation has taken place here.

Defendant

has no fundamental right to sell drugs, let alone to sell them
near school facilities.

The subject statute is not determinative

of guilt or innocence, nor does it enhance the offender's
culpability, as defendant repeatedly suggests. As previously
discussed, the statute's increased penalty is consistent with the
State's legitimate interest in protecting the emotional and
physical well-being of Utah's children.
Concerning the theft statute increasing the penalty for
identical criminal conduct committed under special circumstances,
this Court stated:
It is not unconstitutional for a state to
impose a more severe penalty for a particular
type of crime than the penalty which is
imposed with respect to the general category
of crimes to which the special crime is
related or of which it is a subcategory.
State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1981) (citing Rammell v.
Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977)).

Accordingly, in this case,

the increased punishment for an offense committed under special
circumstances is not unconstitutional.
Defendant also contends that Utah Code Ann. S 58-378(5) violates due process by failing to consider the physical
circumstances of small town drug dealers.

Since defendant fails

to support his argument with legal analysis or case citation,
this Court should not review his contention.
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984).
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See State v.

Finally, defendant contends that S 58-37-8(5) violates
the equal protection clause of the Utah and United States
Constitutions by Htreat[ing] defendants in small towns
differently from those in large cities." Appellant's Brief at
17.

Yet, the statute's language clearly aipplies to all

individuals who deal in drugs within 1,000 feet of school
grounds, regardless of the geographic location of the school.
Apparently, what defendant attempts to argue is that,
while the statute appears facially neutral|, its application has
the effect of treating small town dealers differently from large
city dealers since he claims that in smalll towns the likelihood
of the criminal conduct taking place within 1,000 feet of a
school ground is greater, small-town drug dealers are more likely
to be subject to the higher penalty impose^ by the statute.
Admittedly, it is possible that the statute could enhance the
punishment of a greater percentage of smalfL-town drug dealers
than of their large city counterparts.
is not constitutionally proscribed.

However, such an effect

Small town drug dealers do

not fall within any specially protected group, and there is no
constitutional prohibition against treating larger numbers of a
non-suspect group more harshly than members of a similar group
based upon their choice of residence.

Givfen that the intent of

the law has a rational relation to the State's interest in
protecting its children's emotional and physical well-being, the
statute does not violate equal protection in any event.
While generally, a statute may n^t treat those
similarly situated differently, equal prot0ction of the law
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provisions do not prevent different treatment "as long as there
is a reasonable basis for the difference."
P.2d 261, 266 (Utah 1986).

State v. Bishop, 717

In the instant case, the State has a

strong legitimate interest in protecting its children from drug
use and dependency.

As previously discussed, drug dealing near

school grounds creates an extreme potential for harm to children,
in that children are likely to be targeted as "customers" or be
exposed to a potentially violent criminal element of society.
This potential exists in small towns and large cities alike.

But

most importantly, while drug dealing is more likely to take place
near school grounds in a small town, the potential risk of
children becoming targets is proportionately greater.
The enhanced effect of the statute in small towns is
reasonable in light of the proportionately greater potential risk
which the statute was designed to prevent.

In turn, the

establishment of safeguards to protect children from drug
exposure and dependency is consistent with the State's interest
in protecting its children's emotional and physical well-being.
Therefore, the statute does not violate the equal protection
clause.
POINT IV
UTAH CODE ANN. S 58-37-8(1)(a) SUPPLIES THE
MENS REA FOR DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL ACT,
THEREFORE, HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE NOT
VIOLATED BY THE STRICT LIABILITY SENTENCE
ENHANCEMENT PROVISION.
Utah Code S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) makes it illegal to
intentionally and knowingly distribute a controlled substance as
specified therein.

Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(5) imposes an
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enhanced penalty for that offense when committed within 1,000
feet of a school ground.

Utah Code Ann. £ 58-37-8(5)(d)

establishes that the offender's lack of knowledge about the
proximity of a school is no defense.

Defendant argues that the

latter provision violates due process by Allegedly (1) creating
an irrebuttable presumption; (2) eliminating the mens rea
requirement for the offense; and (3) relieving the State of its
burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Defendant's first and last contentions presuppose that
knowledge of the proximity of a school is or should be an element
of the offense for which he was charged.

Defendant's first

contention merely repeats his due process argument in Point III
of his brief.

Yet, the statute neither presumes nor requires

knowledge of the aggravating factor's presence as an element of
the offense.

Again, the absence of such a^ requirement is

consistent with the State's legitimate interest in protecting its
children's physical and emotional well-being.
makes it irrelevant whether the offender

Since § 58-37-8(5)

knows that he or she is

near a school, it does not create a presumption that he or she
possesses such knowledge.

Rather, sale of drugs near a school is

a strict liability enhancement provision.
On the other hand, the same absence of a requirement of
knowledge as to the aggravating factor's presence precludes
defendant's third contention.

If knowledge of that factor is not

an element of the offense, the State need hot prove defendant's
knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.

Therefore, the statute

would not violate due process on that accotint.
-19-

In his second contention defendant mistakenly states
that 5 58-37-8(5)(d) eliminates the mens rea requirement for the
offense for which he was charged.

Defendant was convicted of

distribution of a controlled substance for value in violation of
S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). That section requires intentional and
knowing distribution as grounds for conviction.

Section 58-37-

8(5)(d) does not eliminate this mens rea requirement.
Section 58-37-8(5) does not create a separate offense
that requires an additional mens rea.

It simply enhances the

penalty for an offense already defined, when the offense is
committed under special circumstances.

In this sense it is

comparable to other statutes which establish the degree of an
offense, or enhance the penalty, under special circumstances.
The Utah theft statute, for example, classifies the degree of the
crime according to the value of the property taken without regard
to whether the actor knew of the value of the property.
Code Ann. S 76-6-412 (1978).

See Utah

Nor does the theft statute require

that the offender intend to take property valued in a particular
amount for penalty purposes.
Section 58-37-8(5) is also similar to statutes which
enhance the penalty imposed upon a person who kills a police
officer.

The constitutionality of such a statute was upheld in

another jurisdiction against a similar claim in spite of the fact
that the statute does not require that the offender know that the
victim is a police officer.

See State v. Compton, 726 P.2d 837

(N.M. 1986).
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In Utah, criminal responsibility attaches when a pen:son
acts "with a mental state specified in th^ statute defining the
offense."

Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-101(1) ($upp. 1987).

The law

does not require that each element of the offense include a
corresponding culpable mental state.

Interestingly, the former

Utah statue defining criminal responsibility required just that.
See Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-101(1) (1978).
in 1983, eliminating the requirement.

The statute was amended

(Compare with Utah Code

Ann. S 76-2-101(1) (Supp. 1987)).
In the instant case, S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) defines the
offense for which defendant was charged, requiring that the
conduct be intentional and knowing.

Sectibn 58-37-8(5) merely

enhances the penalty when an aggravating factor is present.

Utah

law does not require that the aggravating Element be accompanied
by a mens rea.

Therefore, S 58-37-8(5)(d) which eliminates lack

of knowledge about the aggravating factor'b presence as a defense
for the enhanced penalty does not violate due process.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the St^te requests this Court
to affirm defendant's conviction and minim|im mandatory sentence.
DATED THIS J^ti
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